

















In an article in the 8th December 
2011 issue of the French newspaper Libé-
ration, Philippe Cayla, a former French 
civil servant who is currently President 
of Euronews Development, invited read-
ers to join him in initiating a European 
Citizens Initiative which proposes that 
the European Union adopt a rule that 
all EU citizens living in another EU state 
than that of their nationality (so-called 
‘second country nationals’ or SCNs) be 
entitled to vote in the national elections 
of their state of residence.1 Together with 
Catriona Seth, Professor in 18th-century 
French studies at the Université de Lor-
raine, Cayla also launched a debate on 
this topic at the European Citizenship 
Observatory with some rhetorical flour-
ish:
Imagine being a law-abiding EU citi-











AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: AN EXERCISE 
IN CONTEXTUAL 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Summary Debates concerning the ‘democratic deficit’ have been a prevalent feature of 
the normative literature on the European Union, but rather less attention has been paid to 
‘demos problems’ constructed by the normative ordering of the EU and what such prob-
lems reveal about the nature of democratic citizenship in the EU, the character of the EU 
as a normative order and the institutional character of the relationship between the con-
stitution of the EU as a normative order and as a structure of political incentives. This arti-
cle addresses this topic by focusing on one such ‘demos problem’.























no right to vote for the government 
whose decisions will impact on your 
daily life. Does this sound like an Or-
wellian nightmare? Think again. It 
is the fate of large numbers of your 
neighbours or friends.2 
In a recent report, the European 
Commission also drew attention to this 
point, noting that one way in which it 
sees the EU-MS citizenship relationship 
as currently problematic is that:
some EU citizens who move to and 
reside in another Member State may 
lose their right to take part in nation-
al elections in their Member State of 
origin. According to the legislation 
of several Member States (Ireland, 
Hungary, Denmark, Malta, Austria 
and United Kingdom), their nation-
als are disenfranchised if they live in 
another Member State for a certain 
period of time. Many EU citizens in-
formed the Commission and the Eu-
ropean Parliament that they are not 
able to participate in any nation-
al elections, neither in the Member 
State of origin nor in the Member 
State of residence. (EU Commission, 
2010)
The issue raised by Cayla and Seth, 
and acknowledged by the Commission, 
is more than symbolically significant for 
the EU and its member states, even if 
the number of SCNs is estimated at per-
haps only 12 million out of 500 million 
EU citizens, not least because, in high-
lighting this specific issue, it also draws 
attention to the normative ordering of 





we may term ‘demos problems’, that is, 
problems concerning the appropriate 
inclusion of persons within the demos 
of the EU. The issue of national voting 
rights for SCNs is only one of a range 
of such ‘demos problems’ that emerge 
in the context of the EU; others con-
cern the MS-differentiated access to EU 
citizenship of third country nationals 
(TCNs) and to EU voting rights of EU 
citizens resident outside the EU. Each 
of these ‘demos problems’ has its roots 
in the normative ordering of the EU as 
a polity of polities; however, I will focus 
here solely on the SCN ‘demos problem’ 
and the different responses that arise in 
relation to it as well as the ways in which 
this issue reveals a misalignment of the 
constitution of the EU as a normative 
order and as a structure of political in-
centives.
I begin by sketching a generic ac-
count of democratic citizenship, before 
elucidating the precise character of the 
‘demos problem’ in the context of the 
normative architecture of the EU. I then 
turn to consider and evaluate a range of 
possible responses to this problem (and 
their different implications for the EU as 
a polity), before drawing attention to the 
relationship of the EU as a normative or-
der and as a structure of political incen-
tives. In performing this analysis, how-
ever, I am also concerned to provide an 
exemplar of an approach to democratic 
theory that stresses the importance of 
contextualisation and attention to the 
normative and institutional issues that 
arise in elaborating and evaluating pro-
posals for the resolution of ‘demos prob-
lems’. Thus the second aim of this article 
is to demonstrate an approach to mov-



















Citizenship as a political ideal is, 
fundamentally, conceived as equal 
membership in a self-governing political 
community. This ideal has two distinct 
aspects. The first involves seeing citizen-
ship as the legal status of equal consoci-
ate in a democratic polity where that sta-
tus is comprised of a schedule of rights 
and duties that aim to protect citizens 
from the fundamental threats to their 
private and public autonomy, thereby 
enabling citizens as private individuals 
to pursue their own reasonable concep-
tions of the good and as citizens jointly to 
govern the terms of their civic relation-
ship and determine the collective pro-
jects to which they commit themselves 
(see Rawls, 2005; Habermas, 1994; Tully, 
2002 for three variations on this theme). 
The second orients us to seeing citizen-
ship as membership in a free community 
of equals characterised by special obliga-
tions between members that are internal 
to the non-instrumentally valuable good 
of membership and, insofar as they do 
not entail injustice to those excluded 
from this community (Scheffler, 2001: 
48-65), are legitimate obligations of jus-
tice (Miller, 2007). Citizenship as a poli-
tical institution is thus both instrumen-
tal for the realisation of, and a site for the 
expression of, the basic norm of demo-
cratic legitimacy in which, in some suit-
able sense, the governed govern – a form 
of reflexive authority, at once instru-
mental and expressive, in which the go-
verned impose duties on themselves to 
act in accordance with the justice-com-
patible norms and rules that they have, 
as governors, determined (viewed un-
der the first aspect) and in so doing ex-
press their freedom as equals and realise 
the good of membership in this political 
community (viewed under the second 
aspect). In modern polities, such demo-
cratic citizenship is tied to, and symbol-
ised by, possession of equal voting rights 
(although a democratic polity could in 
principle be structured in terms of ‘deci-
sion by acclamation’ or, more plausibly, 
through the decision-making of repre-
sentatives chosen by way of sortition). 
The considerations advanced thus 
far denote the abstract legitimacy norm 
for democratic polities regardless of the 
level of governance (municipal, state, 
supranational, etc.) at which they oper-
ate – and they articulate a basic norm 
of inclusion: all those who are subject 
to the collectively binding authority of 
the polity should be included as mem-
bers of the political community. Howev-
er, projected directly onto practice, this 
norm of inclusion is problematic in that 
it does not address the issue of who is le-
gitimately entitled to count as a subject 
of political authority. Tourists are, how-
ever fleetingly, subject to the political 
authority of the state they visit. Irregular 
migrants are subject to the political au-
thority of the state in which they reside, 
but formally lack an entitlement to pre-
sence within its jurisdiction. Second ge-
neration or third generation or yet more 
distant expatriate citizens are subjects of 
rule of their state of ‘nationality’ since 
they have a duty to comply with the 
norms and rules of the relevant politi-
cal authority whenever the conditions of 
application of these norms and rules are 
satisfied, but they may lack any genuine 
connection to the state. What is need-
ed to reflect on such cases is a contex-
tualisation of the norm of inclusion that 
is sufficiently thick to establish criteria 
governing the legitimate acquisition or 
loss of the status of being a subject of 
rule in a democratic polity. Such contex-
























reflection on the two aspects of demo-
cratic citizenship and, second, attention 
to the point and purpose of any specific 
kind of democratic polity.
Returning to the two aspects of citi-
zenship as a political ideal, we can dis-
tinguish two general sets of reasons for 
valuing political membership. First, pro-
tective/enabling reasons which stress the 
instrumental value of political member-
ship in terms of protecting/enabling the 
conditions of social and political auto-
nomy. Second, expressive reasons which 
emphasise the non-instrumental value 
of standing in a relation of political com-
munity with others, of political mem-
bership as a source and site of political 
belonging. These general sets of reasons 
provide two general criteria for acquisi-
tion/loss of political membership:
1. An entitlement to a fair opportunity 
to acquire (or not to suffer the loss 
of) political membership insofar as 
one is subject to, and dependent on, 
the relevant political authority for 
the protection/enablement of the ba-
sic conditions of one’s social and po-
litical autonomy. 
2. An entitlement to a fair opportunity 
to acquire (or not to suffer the loss 
of) political membership insofar as 
the political community is a source 
of non-instrumental value for one-
self conditional on the membership 
of persons who stand in the type of 
position that one occupies in rela-
tionship to the political community 
not undermining the good of mem-
bership.
The criteria of ‘a fair opportunity’ will 
be significantly determined by the point 
and purpose of the type of polity.3 To il-
3 It will also be affected by the relationship in 
which the person stands to the polity. Con-
lustrate, consider the contrast between 
municipal and state forms of polity.
The point and purpose of municipal 
governance is to provide a range of ser-
vices (policing, health, education, sport-
ing facilities, garbage collection, etc.) 
to those who live in a specified locali-
ty. Conceived as a self-governing polity, 
the democratic legitimacy of the muni-
cipality thus requires its inclusion of all 
competent lawful residents who are de-
pendent on these services for the protec-
tion and/or enabling of their autonomy. 
sider the example of the state. The first crite-
rion provides a basis at the level of the state 
for addressing the distinction between refu-
gees, regular and irregular migrants since 
what constitutes a fair opportunity of acqui-
sition can vary according to different needs 
and circumstances of dependency. Thus, for 
example, it is prima facie reasonable that re-
fugees have an accelerated/easier path to the 
acquisition of political membership relative 
to regular migrants and that irregular mi-
grants have a slower/more difficult path to 
acquisition that regular migrants (though 
these judgements are defeasible and may be 
contextually variable on a case by case basis). 
The second criterion provides a basis for dis-
tinguishing different generations and catego-
ries of expatriates in terms of variable crite-
ria of fair opportunity of not to suffer loss. 
Thus, for example, the criteria for 1st gene-
ration emigrants (at least those over the age 
of 5 on departure) will be much weaker (say, 
a simple declaration) than for 2nd genera-
tion emigrants who may, for example, be re-
quired to have spent a period of time in the 
state of nationality or otherwise demonstrat-
ed a commitment to it in order to retain po-
litical membership. Such criteria would pre-
sumptively become more demanding for the 
3rd generation and may reasonably be taken 
to converge with criteria for non-citizen resi-



















This norm finds expression, as Bauböck 
(2007a) has cogently argued, in the legal 
principle of jus domicile. Thus, a fair op-
portunity to acquire citizenship in this 
municipal polity would require no more 
than lawful residence as signalled, for 
example, by being liable for local taxa-
tion. While it is true that membership 
of this local political community may 
be a significant site of non-instrumen-
tal value for persons, it is also true that 
the value of membership in the munici-
pal political community is undermined 
for its membership if that membership 
is divorced from presence in the locality. 
In this respect, and given that maintain-
ing membership only requires not leav-
ing the locality, members who do leave 
can be legitimately stripped of mem-
bership. By contrast, if we consider the 
point and purpose of state governance, 
this involves, internally, a normatively 
deeper and more expansive structuring 
of the conditions of members’ lives and, 
externally, the protective and expressive 
role of the state as an international ac-
tor. In this case, the democratic state is 
an intergenerational project of self-gov-
ernment in which, as a polity, it protects 
and enables the autonomy of its citi-
zens (inside and outside the state’s bor-
ders), while, as a political community, it 
gives expression to its distinctive politi-
cal identity in the domestic and foreign 
policies that it enacts. Here a ‘fair op-
portunity’ to acquire citizenship entails 
reference to the demands of stability for 
such a community and hence the impor-
tance of a ‘genuine connection’ (jus nexi) 
with the state, of being what Bauböck 
has termed a ‘stakeholder’. This sup-
ports the use of jus sanguinis and jus soli 
as principles of membership, albeit that 
the former is limited as the connection 
diminishes across emigrant generations 
(by the second generation born abroad, 
a generation raised in another state by 
parents raised in another state, it is hard 
to maintain that a ‘genuine connection’ 
persists) and the latter may legitimate-
ly be qualified in terms of the length of 
the parent’s residence (i.e., children born 
to tourists and temporary workers need 
not qualify since the normatively salient 
feature is the presumption that children 
will be raised in, and shaped by being 
raised in, the state of residence). It also 
supports the use of jus domicile when 
qualified by a relevantly extensive pe-
riod of residence. Unlike the municipal 
case, it acknowledges that at least first 
generation emigrants maintain a stake 
in virtue of being shaped by the state of 
nationality and in virtue of the fact that 
the withdrawal of citizenship from them 
removes a source of non-instrumental 
value where this is not required to main-
tain the value of membership. 
These considerations offer a frame-
work for analysing democratic citizen-
ship that is, as indicated, closely akin 
to Bauböck’s ‘stakeholder model’ (2003, 
2005, 2007b, 2009) in that, in contrast 
to the social membership model deve-
loped by Carens (2013: 158-169) and 
Rubio-Marin (2000, 2006), it ties mem-
bership directly to ‘stakes’ in the polity. 
However, it is not my purpose in this ar-
ticle to focus on these theoretical diffe-
rences which I have explored elsewhere, 
rather my concern is with putting this 
account to work in analysing the de-
mos problems of the European Union 
and it is, hence, to that task that I now 
turn.
National Voting Rights and SCNs
Second country nationals are per-
sons who move from one member state 
of the European Union to another mem-
























will assume that the MS that they leave 
is the state whose nationality they hold 
and that they do not also hold the na-
tionality of the state in which they now 
reside. To draw out the issue, we can 
consider the issue of national voting 
rights across three different contexts be-
fore we turn to the case of the European 
Union: (a) states that are not members 
of any wider form of political union, (b) 
states that are members of an intergo-
vernmental union characterised by a 
joint commitment to free movement, 
and (c) states that are members of a fe-
deral union.
(A) States that are not members of any 
wider form of political union
A useful starting point from which 
to develop our normative framework for 
this question is provided by Dahl’s argu-
ment for the ‘principle of full inclusion’: 
‘The demos must include all adult mem-
bers of the association except transients 
and persons proved to be mentally defec-
tive’ (1989: 129), where ‘adult members 
of the association’ refers to ‘all adults 
subject to the binding collective decisions 
of the association’ (ibid.: 120). As Lopez-
Guerra helpfully notes, Dahl’s specifi-
cation of criteria of democracy can be 
summarised thus:
(1) governments must give equal 
consideration to the good and inter-
ests of every person bound by their 
laws (principle of intrinsic equality); 
(2) unless there is compelling evi-
dence to the contrary, every person 
should be considered to be the best 
judge of his or her own good and 
interests (presumption of personal 
autonomy); therefore (3) all adults 
[who are not merely transients (1) 
and are not shown to be mentally de-
fective (2)] should be assumed to be 
sufficient well-qualified to partici-
pate in the collective decision-mak-
ing processes of the polity (strong 
principle of equality). (2005: 219, my 
insertion)
In the context of a democratic state 
characterised in part by authority over 
a territorial jurisdiction, Dahl’s account 
implies that any competent adult who 
is habitually resident within the ter-
ritory of the state and, hence, subject 
to the laws and policies of its govern-
ment is entitled to full inclusion with-
in the demos.4 Such an argument can 
be taken to underwrite Walzer’s claim 
that the denial by a state of full political 
rights to legally-admitted habitual resi-
dents amounts to citizen tyranny (Walz-
er, 1983: 55).5 The justification of the ex-
clusion of transient non-members from 
the demos appears somewhat unmoti-
vated in Dahl’s account – and this leads 
to a line of objection to the appeal of the 
normative recourse to subjection to col-
lectively binding decisions as the sole 
criterion of civic membership. The ob-
jection is simply that the subjection cri-
terion does not rule out transients but, 
as Dahl’s own exclusion of transients re-
veals, it is counter-intuitive to include 
4 Although Dahl talks of the principle of all 
affected interests, I agree with Lopez-Guer-
ra (2005: 222-5) that, since it is being go-
verned that is the normatively relevant is-
sue for Dahl, the relevant principle is that of 
being subjected to rule rather than being af-
fected by rule. For defences of the all-affect-
ed principle, see Shapiro (2003) and Goodin 
(2008).
5 Walzer links this claim to one in which the 
polity has the right to determine its own en-
try criteria as an element of its right to self-
determination; for an excellent analysis of 
the difficulties that this conjunction gene-


















them. I will address this criticism to 
bring out the importance of contextual-
ising this abstract norm.
A first response to this objection is 
to deny that transients should be ex-
cluded. This response notes that the ob-
jection’s intuitive force hangs on taking 
an equal right of participation in the de-
mos to entail a right of equal participa-
tion in the demos. But this does not fol-
low. If a person’s autonomy is infringed 
by a law, that grounds an entitlement to 
be included in the demos with respect to 
that law; it does not imply, for example, 
the equal weighting of the votes given to 
transient and non-transient members 
of the demos. It does not do so because 
while it is the mere fact of subjection 
to coercion that grounds an equal right 
to be a member of the demos with re-
spect to the relevant law (or range of 
laws), this does not license the view that 
the scope and degree of subjection has 
no normative significance with respect 
to what it is to treat persons as political 
equals. On the contrary, treating peo-
ple as political equals requires both tak-
ing subjection as a non-scalar property 
in terms of entitlement to membership 
of the demos and as a scalar property 
in terms of, say, the weighting of their 
votes within the demos. Once we see 
this point, the intuitive force of the ob-
jection to the inclusion of transients in 
the demos is dissolved. 
As a general point of argument in 
democratic theory, this response strikes 
me as cogent, but it operates at a non-
contextualised level and elides the point 
that the state is a distinctive form of 
democratic polity, one that requires a 
relatively stable demos for its reproduc-
tion over time as a community of soli-
darity. This is where we need to turn 
from an emphasis simply on the demo-
cratic state as a protective/enabling re-
gime (subjection to collectively binding 
laws) to the democratic state as a com-
munity of belonging. Once we introduce 
this second dimension of the state, an al-
ternate justification of the exclusion of 
transient non-members becomes clear, 
namely, that transient non-members do 
not stand in the appropriate relationship 
of belonging to the demos of the state in 
which they are present. However, this 
justification has a necessary corollary: 
since transiently present non-members 
of one state are also transiently absent 
members of another state to which they 
do stand in the appropriate relationship, 
they should retain membership of the 
demos of the state from which they are 
temporarily absent. Furthermore, the 
specification of the concept of ‘transient’ 
requires that each of the two dimensions 
of the democratic state is involved in 
such specification. (One plausible view 
of the range of time required for non-
transient presence/absence is four to 
eight years.) On the basis of these nor-
mative considerations, we can say that in 
the case of independent states, external 
voting rights are required for transient 
absentees (short-term temporary work-
ers, students) and, we can add, also for 
those whose externality is a function of 
state roles (diplomats, members of the 
armed services) on the same grounds 
that they are ruled out for those who are 
merely transiently present (e.g., tourists, 
students, short-term temporary work-
ers). 
What of long-term expatriates who 
are not performing state roles? Here our 
normative framework supports the view 
that (a) such expatriates should be enti-
tled, as non-transients, to membership 
of the state in which they reside and (b) 
























sible for national legislative and presi-
dential elections, and only required in 
the case of constitutional referenda. 
They are permissible in the former cases 
because inclusion in the demos is neither 
forbidden (residence is not a necessary 
criterion of subjection to collectively 
binding decisions nor having a present 
stake in the polity) nor required (expa-
triates are not subject to the comprehen-
sive application of rules that character-
ises residents). In the latter case, they are 
required since constitutional referenda 
concern the character of one’s legal per-
sonality as a citizen or, more generally, 
the terms of the political association of 
which one is a member. To give a dra-
matic example, if the UK held a refe-
rendum on withdrawal from the EU, all 
citizens – no matter where they reside – 
would be bound by this decision and (if 
this were their only MS nationality) their 
entitlement to EU citizenship would 
hang on the outcome.6 It might be ob-
jected that this example biases the case 
because it significantly affects the inter-
ests of non-resident citizens, so consid-
er as an alternative the Irish 2004 refe-
rendum on constraining jus soli which by 
definition did not affect external citizens 
since their children born abroad still 
could claim Irish citizenship through 
jus sanguinis. In this case, it might be ar-
gued that since the outcome of the refe-
rendum would apply to external citizens 
6 This being the case, we may hold that un-
der such circumstances the EU has, given 
its commitment to freedom of movement, a 
duty of justice towards those affected to en-
sure that they are disadvantaged as little as 
possible – for example, by granting them a 
secure EU denizenship status which ena-
bles them to regain EU citizenship through 
acquisition of the nationality of the MS in 
which they reside.
only in the way that domestic legislation 
applies to them, that voting in constitu-
tional referenda would be treated like 
voting in national elections, namely, as 
permissible but not required. I would 
resist this conclusion since what dif-
ferentiates the constitutional case from 
standard domestic legislation is that it 
concerns the basic terms of the political 
association. If citizenship is fundamen-
tally membership in a self-governing 
political community and constitution-
al rules express the basic commitments 
of that political community, its juridical 
understanding of its own self-governing 
character, then all citizens should be en-
titled to a say in relation to those rules 
irrespective of whether they are indivi-
dually affected by them.7
That the normative implications of 
political membership are changed by the 
shift in institutional context is most ob-
viously demonstrated by the fact that, 
given the current institutional architec-
ture of the EU, it is not compatible with 
the civic equality of EU citizens to have 
voting rights in national or EU elec-
tions in more than one MS, whereas in 
the case of independent states, there is 
no breach of civic equality in a person 
exercising votes in distinct and unrelat-
ed electoral contests. But it is important 
to note that the significance of the trans-
formation depends on the type of go-
vernmental entity that the EU is, a point 
that we can explore by way of contrast 
with purely intergovernmental and ful-
ly federalised systems that are also com-
mitted to free movement within the ter-
ritorial area that they cover. 
7 I am grateful to Rainer Bauböck for the ex-


















(B) States that are members of 
an intergovernmental union 
characterised by free movement
In the case of a purely intergovern-
mental structure where the norm of free 
movement is grounded on a joint com-
mitment to a shared aim or purpose such 
as, for example, a European market, the 
normative context remains largely but 
not wholly equivalent to that of inde-
pendent states who are not engaged in 
such a project. The salient difference is 
that the shared purpose brings into play 
the principle of justice that the partners 
to this project should not act to frustrate 
this joint enterprise and should, where 
compatible with their distinct national 
contexts and projects, aim to facilitate it. 
Such a principle could be expressed, for 
example, by offering preferential treat-
ment to the citizens of partner states 
for access to membership rights and for 
dual citizenship.
(C)  States in a federal union 
characterised by a right 
of free movement
In the case of a fully federalised sys-
tem, the norm of free movement may 
serve instrumental purposes, but is, 
fundamentally, a norm of social justice 
expressing a basic liberty of citizens as 
federal citizens and, as such, state citi-
zenship is subordinate to federal citi-
zenship in the sense that freedom of 
movement requires that anyone exer-
cising their right to cross the borders of 
states within such a union must not be 
disadvantaged at any level of citizenship 
within the federal structure. A straight-
forward way to institute such a rule of 
justice is to adopt a residence-based rule 
for citizenship in the states that comprise 
the federal union. This is not the only 
way to institute such a rule but, given a 
territorial mode of governance, it has the 
advantage of aligning voting rights with 
primary contexts of governance. 
The EU stands between these inter-
governmental and federal examples in 
an interesting way. First, the EU is for-
mally characterised by what we may call 
the principle of jus civitatis such that ci-
tizenship of the EU is derived from citi-
zenship of an MS (Bauböck, 2007c). Sec-
ond, since its commitment to freedom of 
movement has moved from an econom-
ic model tied to a largely intergovern-
mental structure to a more civic model 
(which retains some features of the for-
mer) commensurate with its develop-
ment of federal as well as intergovern-
mental features. While it is the case that 
this civic model now identifies freedom 
of movement as a right of EU citizens 
(although Article 21(1) TFEU specifies 
that this right may be subject to certain 
limitations and conditions) and not sim-
ply as workers (see, for instance, Cases 
C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR 
I-7091, paragraph 84, and C-200/02, Zhu 
and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925, paragraph 
26, cited in EU Commission, 2010, fn. 
4), it remains the case that the EU is a 
mixed type of governmental entity and 
consequently the relationship between 
EU citizenship and MS citizenship can-
not be conceptualised simply in terms 
of the priority of the former or the lat-
ter but, rather, is to be seen as engaging a 
form of mediation between the two.
The problem here is not simply that 
MSs have different rules governing ac-
cess to national voting rights for emi-
grant nationals in the EU and immigrant 
EU citizens, but also that the authority to 
determine these rules may remain large-
ly at the discretion of the MS, although 
























solidarity. Whereas it is widely accepted, 
given their primary function, that resi-
dence is the appropriate criterion for lo-
cal/municipal elections and it is clear 
that EU citizenship would hardly be 
meaningful if EU citizens resident in the 
EU could not vote (and stand for elec-
tion) in EP elections, it is the case that in 
leaving national voting rights out of its 
requirements for mobile EU citizens, the 
EU and its MSs avoided having to agree 
on rules governing the self-constitution 
of the national demos by requiring MSs 
either to include resident non-nationals 
who are EU citizens or to include expa-
triate nationals. However, with the shift 
from an economic to a civic grounding 
of the norm of free movement, this po-
sition is no longer compatible with the 
requirements of political equality in the 
EU. It may be reasonable for there to be 
some limitations and restrictions on the 
freedom of movement of EU citizens, 
but it is not reasonable given this right 
as a civic right that such restrictions un-
dermine the point and purpose of civic 
rights in securing political equality. The 
demos problem that may contingently 
confront SCNs is a democratic wrong. 
But while it may be relatively straight-
forward to see that, as a matter of justice, 
EU citizens resident in the EU should 
not be required to sacrifice national vot-
ing rights to secure the benefits of le-
gitimately exercising their right of free 
movement, this point only raises the fur-
ther question of where EU citizens who 
have exercised this right should be enti-
tled to vote. 
The SCN ‘Demos Problem’: 
Redressing a Democratic Wrong
In this section, I will lay out five pos-
sible responses to the SCN demos prob-
lem. There are four options available as 
simple rules and one as a more complex 
rule that emerges from reflections on the 
limitations of some of the simple rules. 
Each of these rules would resolve the 
problem. I will start by addressing these 
rules in terms of (a) the ‘best fit’ with the 
current institutional structure of the EU 
before turning to (b) which rule is easi-
est to adopt and implement and (c) what 
are the likely costs and side-effects of the 
different rules?
The four simple rules are these:
1) National voting rights in the state of 
residence.
2) National voting rights in the state of 
nationality.
3) The choice between (1) and (2).
4) A time-differentiated combination of 
(1) and (2) which starts with (2) and, 
after a period of residence, switches 
to (1).
We have already noted that (1) is 
the characteristic feature of fully federal 
systems and has the advantage in such 
structures of ensuring that voting rights 
track the primary contexts of govern-
ance. The key normative issue raised by 
(1) is whether the political autonomy of 
EU citizens, who are not citizens of the 
MS within which they are resident, is 
adequately secured if they lack national 
voting rights in that MS. This is a serious 
consideration since the MS of residence 
is their primary context of governance, 
but it should also be noted that (1) has 
the disadvantage in respect of the EU of 
effectively severing the formal demo-
cratic relationship of such EU citizens to 
their MS of nationality. By contrast, (2) 
maintains that relationship, but means 
that such EU citizens cannot vote in 
what arguably constitutes their prima-
ry context of rule. Acknowledging these 


















vantages may incline us to (3), namely, 
letting each individual decide for them-
selves, while (4) may be seen as an at-
tempt to combine the advantages and 
minimize the disadvantages of (1) and 
(2) in a way that registers the salience 
of the ‘centre of gravity’ of one’s life as it 
changes over time.
In response to the normative force of 
(1), it may reasonably be argued that in-
sofar as such EU citizens enjoy local and 
EU political rights as well as the rights 
to join (or found) political parties/or-
ganisations in the state of residence and 
other general rights of political partici-
pation in the democratic political life of 
the state of residence, as well as secure 
conditions of residence, the conditions 
of their political autonomy are suffi-
ciently secured. This is, I think, plausi-
ble if and only if such EU citizens also 
enjoy a right to acquire political mem-
bership of the state of residence within 
a reasonable timeframe. In the absence 
of such an entitlement, they are forced 
to trade off the good of political mem-
bership in a primary context of govern-
ance against the good of free movement. 
This right of membership need not be 
presented on the same terms as available 
for resident non-EU citizens. One could 
argue, for example, that a longer time-
period would be justified in the case of 
resident non-national EU citizens com-
pared to other resident non-nationals 
who do not enjoy the same protections 
as EU citizens, although my own prefer-
ence (on the basis of arguments in Owen 
2011) would not be to vary the time-
frame, but to adopt an automatic con-
ferral (with opt-out) for non-EU citizens 
and an automatic entitlement (with opt-
in) for EU citizens as a way of register-
ing the relevant normative distinction 
between their positions. 
It should be noted that the form 
of this objection to (1) entails that (2), 
when appropriately linked to rights of 
naturalisation for EU citizens in other 
MSs, effectively accommodates (3) and 
(4) while ruling out the possible strate-
gic voting complications that an unqua-
lified version of (3) could introduce. Let 
us call this complex rule (5). Moreover, 
whereas (1) arguably both devalues na-
tional citizenship in a way that is not 
consonant with the institutional charac-
ter of the EU and pre-emptively pushes 
towards a fully federal conception of the 
EU, (5) acknowledges the mixed charac-
ter of the EU and the mediated character 
of citizenship in the Euro-polity com-
posed of the relation between the EU 
and its MSs. Perhaps more fundamen-
tally, (5) rather than (1) gets the current 
distribution of political responsibility 
right: since EU citizenship is acquired 
through citizenship of an MS, the prima-
ry responsibility for ensuring that an EU 
citizen is not politically disadvantaged 
by exercising the right of free movement 
lies with the MS through whom EU ci-
tizenship is acquired and not the MS in 
which the EU citizen is resident.
There are, then, good reasons to fa-
vour (5) as the best fit with the current 
institutional structure of the EU, but this 
cannot be the only criterion when we 
are confronted with a democratic wrong 
that requires urgent attention. For this 
reason, we need to also consider which 
rule is easiest to adopt and implement as 
well as the likely costs and side-effects 
of the different rules. I will focus on op-
tions (1) and (5).
Let us turn to the second criterion of 
evaluation: which rule is likely to be easi-
est to adopt and implement? This mat-
ters because it is relevant to ask not just 
























to remove the democratic wrong and 
harms at stake here. On this count, (5) 
does less well. It is certainly likely to be 
difficult to get all MSs of the EU to co-
ordinate their national legislation in this 
way (particularly if they have constitu-
tional provisions against expatriate vot-
ing). Here Cayla and Seth’s ECI propos-
al of (1) looks more straightforward and 
exhibits greater continuity with existing 
EU practices such as resident-based vot-
ing rights for EU citizens in local and 
EU elections.
On the third dimension, namely, 
likely costs and side-effects, (1) has both 
strong positives and negatives. On the 
positive side, it provides political repre-
sentation in an SCN’s immediate context 
of governance and it would also resolve 
the political effects of the quite radical 
disparities between the implementa-
tion of the EU rule on local voting rights 
(consider the comparison of France and 
the UK, for example, where in France lo-
cal voting rights are restricted to the level 
of the commune, while in the UK they 
include not only local and county coun-
cil elections but also extend to voting in 
devolved assembly elections in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland), since it 
would remove any constraints that per-
tain to the linkage of local and nation-
al representation (as occur, for example, 
in France where members of the Senate 
are chosen through an electoral college 
comprised of locally-elected officials). 
On the negative side, (1) completely se-
vers the political relationship between 
citizens and their state of nationality and 
also breaks the widely held link between 
citizenship of the state and voting rights 
(although this link does not hold univer-
sally even between EU member states, as 
the mutual granting of voting rights be-
tween the Republic of Ireland and the 
UK illustrates). By contrast, (5) does not 
deliver the strong positives or negatives 
of option (1). It maintains the linkage 
between national citizenship and suf-
frage at the national level while allowing 
EU citizens to reflect the change in their 
primary contexts of governance through 
naturalization. A significant difference is 
that whereas (5) coheres with the insti-
tutional structure of the EU as it stands, 
(1) orients the EU to the telos of a federal 
political structure.
These considerations illustrate that 
there is a genuine political choice to be 
made between (1) and (5) – a choice 
which involves weighing the following 
range of factors: how to weigh the pro-
tective/enabling dimension of national 
citizenship against the identity/belong-
ing dimensions of national citizenship, 
how to weigh the urgency of the demo-
cratic wrong and difficulty of implemen-
tation, how to weigh the potential costs 
and side-effects of the different rules. 
These are all issues on which reasonable 
people may reasonably disagree.
Normative Order 
and Political Incentives
Having identified and analysed the 
two primary candidates for the resolu-
tion of the SCN demos problem and, 
hence, redressing the democratic wrong 
that it embodies, let us turn to the ques-
tion of responsibility for redressing this 
wrong and the resources available with-
in the EU to support movement towards 
adopting either of these proposals. 
What is the normative basis on which 
we can assign responsibility for redress-
ing the SCN demos problem? Although 
as a matter of basic democratic justice, 
there is an obligation across the EU and 


















priate allocation of responsibility must 
acknowledge that the question of who 
has voting rights in national elections in 
each MS is constitutionally reserved for 
each MS, so, prima facie, responsibility 
lies primarily with the MSs and the nor-
mative ground of this MS responsibility 
within the EU as a normative order is its 
commitment to solidarity.
We can begin by noting that ‘soli-
darity’ has been a basic value of the EU 
acknowledged in its founding and re-
founding documents from the Pream-
ble to the Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community 
Treaty (1951) to the Single European Act 
(1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and 
the Treaty of Lisbon (2006). The last of 
these documents explicitly places soli-
darity as a value that should govern both 
relations between MS and between EU 
citizens. Sangiovanni (2013) argues that 
solidarity names a special kind of asso-
ciative obligation triggered by (among 
other conditions) joint action. On this 
account, solidarity binds agents togeth-
er through joint and reciprocal action in 
the pursuit of a goal or set of goals – and 
in the case of the EU, these joint goals 
can be specified as a significant, if medi-
ated, set of collective goods (including a 
single market, reliable system of supra-
national law, internal mobility, and re-
gional stability) which the EU aims to 
provide and, thereby, the joint action re-
quired to provide such goods, the fair re-
turn that member states and European 
citizens owe one another can therefore 
be conceived as a form of specifically co-
operative solidarity (Sangiovanni, 2013). 
These associate obligations encompass 
the intersection of democratic member-
ship and the right of free movement (a 
point which has recently been brought 
to the fore in EU debates on the decision 
of Malta to make its national citizenship 
– and hence EU citizenship – available 
for sale),8 and hence provide a norma-
tive obligation on the MSs of the EU to 
take responsibility for bringing about 
the adoption of rules that resolve the 
SCN demos problem.
Considered as a normative order, 
then, the EU provides a clear assignment 
of responsibility for MSs to ensure that 
SCNs are not disenfranchised at the le-
vel of national elections in virtue of ex-
ercising their civil right of free move-
ment and, at the same time, the general 
obligation on the EU entails that the in-
stitutions of the EU should support and 
facilitate MSs in their discharging of 
this responsibility. Yet here we confront 
a tension or misalignment between the 
constitution of the EU as a normative 
order and as a structure of political in-
centives in that the political incentives 
constructed by the institutional archi-
tecture of the EU do not provide mo-
tivation for enacting these associative 
obligations. To see this, we should note 
that the weighting of representation 
(number of seats allocated to each MS) 
in the European Parliament and of vot-
ing rights in the Council are organised 
in a way that is related to ‘resident popu-
lation’ sizes, albeit not in a directly pro-
portional manner (and we should note 
there are arguments for adapting the 
norm; for example, semi-successfully by 
Italy in respect of its external vote). It is 
an implication of the institutional rule 
that MSs already enjoy the benefits of 
the counting of their resident SCN (and, 
for that matter, TCN) population in 
the determination of their weighted re-


























presentation and voting rights. This not 
only adds insult to the injury suffered by 
SCNs who lack national voting rights in 
any MS; it is also both normatively and 
politically problematic.
We can first ask why population sizes 
should be taken to be the relevant con-
sideration (even if qualified by various 
other factors). Consider that the distri-
bution of seats in national and local elec-
tions in Europe (in contrast to the USA) 
is not typically a function of population 
sizes, but of numbers of eligible vot-
ers – and there is a basic reason for this, 
namely, that it is the demos and not the 
population that is the normatively rele-
vant item for electoral purposes. The 
Liberal Democrat MEP Andrew Duff 
has argued in favour of the use of popu-
lation sizes on the basis that the ‘Madi-
sonian approach suggests that the Euro-
pean Parliament represents not only de 
jure EU citizens (as formally established 
by the EU Treaty) but that it also repre-
sents, and has a duty of care towards, an-
yone else who abides in the territory of 
the Union, including minors and deni-
zens. That being the case, the tradition-
al method of distributing seats in the 
Parliament on the basis of total resident 
population – to say nothing of counting 
votes in the council – is the right one and 
should not be amended’ (cited in Shaw, 
2010). But is this justifiable? The fact that 
representatives’ duties of representation 
extend beyond those who can vote for or 
against them in no way implies that per-
sons other than voters should count in 
determining constituency/seat distribu-
tions, although it may be an argument 
for differential resources for the offices 
of representatives. Thus, for example, a 
representative whose constituency con-
tains a large vote-ineligible population 
can reasonably be given greater resour-
ces for his representative activities than 
one whose constituency is not so char-
acterised. Imagine two towns, Procreatia 
and Condominia, each with 60,000 eligi-
ble voters, but where households in Pro-
creatia have an average of 2 adults and 4 
children, in Condominia the household 
average is 2 adults and 1 child. There are 
clearly grounds for arguing that Procre-
atia requires more schools, playgrounds 
and other resources than Condomi-
nia, but this does not provide any demo-
cratic grounds (that do not appeal to en-
franchising children) for arguing that 
Procreatia should have more MPs than 
Condominia. 
And this normative point has politi-
cal bite. As already noted, the use of po-
pulation as the key factor for determin-
ing levels of representation in the Euro-
pean Parliament and the weighting of 
voting rights in the Council entails that 
there is no institutional incentive for 
MSs to enfranchise SCNs (whether they 
are expatriate citizens or resident non-
citizens), whereas a demos-based rule 
for the allocation of levels of representa-
tion in the European Parliament and the 
weighting of voting rights in the Council 
would align the political incentive with 
the normative argument by motivating 
MSs to discharge their responsibility to 
resolve the SCN demos problem.
It should, of course, be acknow-
ledged that institutional incentives are 
not the only incentives that may be in 
play in the politics of the EU. However, 
given realistic assumptions concerning 
the motivation of MSs, it remains a seri-
ous problem of institutional design that 
the EU as a normative order and the EU 




















This article has sought to engage in 
two tasks. At a methodological level, it 
has been concerned with demonstrating 
one way of moving from ideal to non-
ideal democratic theory through a pro-
cess of contextualisation of the abstract 
critical norms of democratic theory and 
attention to the trade-offs between best 
fit, ease of implementation and costs 
and side-effects in evaluating proposals 
for democratic reform (in this case, pro-
posals for resolving demos problems), as 
well as consideration of the relationship 
between the distribution of responsibili-
ty for achieving such reforms and the in-
stitutional structure of incentives with-
in which the relevant actors are located. 
At a substantive level, it has attempted to 
identify and analyse one central ‘demos 
problem’ within the EU, to lay out and 
evaluate various proposals for resolv-
ing this ‘demos problem’, and to diag-
nose the obstructions that arise to such 
reform from the institutional character 
of the EU in terms of the misalignment 
of the EU as a normative order with the 
EU as a structure of political incentives. 
The upshot of this analysis is to suggest 
that while MSs have primary responsibi-
lity for resolving the SCN ‘demos prob-
lem’, there is no institutional incentive 
for them to do so – in this respect, the 
burdens for the resolution of the prob-
lem become a test of the solidarity of EU 
citizens and their willingness to develop 
and support political campaigns for re-
form such as Cayla and Seth’s use of the 
European Citizens Initiative.
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Problemi demosa i Europska Unija: 
vježba iz kontekstualne demokratske teorije 
SAŽETAK  Rasprave povezane s “demokratskim deficitom” uvelike su prisutne u normativ-
noj literaturi koja se bavi Europskom Unijom, no puno je manje prostora dano “problemu 
demosa” koji proizlazi iz normativnog uređenja EU-a i pitanju što nam taj problem govori 
o prirodi demokratskoga građanstva u EU-u, karakteru EU-a kao normativnog poretka te o 
institucionalnom karakteru odnosa između ustava EU-a kao normativnog poretka i struk-
ture političkih poticaja. Članak se fokusira na “problem demosa”. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI  demos, građanstvo, Europska Unija, političko članstvo
